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Freitag, 16. März 2018

it is very important to buy foreign law bonds !!

it is very important to buy foreign law bonds !!

Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside)
followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of
bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit
CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares
of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis
deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange
of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit
against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the
foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result
was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of
writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face
value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without
holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have
been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government
intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring

Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside)
followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of
bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit
CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares
of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis
deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange
of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit
against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the
foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result
was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of
writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face
value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without
holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have
been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government
intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring


Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside)
followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of
bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit
CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares
of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis
deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange
of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit
against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the
foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result
was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of
writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face
value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without
holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have
been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government
intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring
page 47

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2135.en.pdf

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